Can we hope to build a secure computer-use agent?

Florian Tramèr – ETH Zurich

Agents 1.0. Text + APIs + Tool use



What are agents?

"Agent" can be defined in several ways. Some customers define agents as fully autonomous systems that operate independently over extended periods, using various tools to accomplish complex tasks. Others use the term to describe more prescriptive implementations that follow predefined workflows. At Anthropic, we categorize all these variations as **agentic systems**, but draw an important architectural distinction between **workflows** and **agents**:

- **Workflows** are systems where LLMs and tools are orchestrated through predefined code paths.
- **Agents**, on the other hand, are systems where LLMs dynamically direct their own processes and tool usage, maintaining control over how they accomplish tasks.

Agents 2.0. Vision is back!





There’s just one problem: **prompt injections!**

Example: exfiltrate PII through Github issues…



https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2025/chatgpt-operator-prompt-injection-exploits/



https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2025/chatgpt-operator-prompt-injection-exploits/

<u>Hot take:</u> there's no hope of solving this problem *at the LLM layer*

We still haven’t solved **adversarial examples**

90% Tabby Cat

+



Adversarial noise

=

100% Guacamole

We still haven't solved **adversarial examples**



Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use. Fu et al. 2024

We still haven’t solved **adversarial examples**



Defenses at the LLM level are **brittle.**

- Better prompting
- Prompt “sandwiching”
- Detect and filter attacks
- Data sanitization
- Adversarial training / instruction hierarchy
- …

A new hope: ***sandboxing.***



https://simonwillison.net/2023/Apr/25/dual-llm-pattern/

Google DeepMind

🐫 Defeating Prompt Injections by Design

Edoardo Debenedetti[1,3*], Ilia Shumailov[2], Tianqi Fan[1], Jamie Hayes[2], Nicholas Carlini[2], Daniel Fabian[1], Christoph Kern[1], Chongyang Shi[2], Andreas Terzis[2] and Florian Tramèr[3]

[1]Google, [2]Google DeepMind, [3]ETH Zurich


User query
"Find Bob's email in my last email and send him a reminder about tomorrow's meeting"
Privileged LLM


User query
"Find Bob's email in my last email and send him a reminder about tomorrow's meeting"
Privileged LLM
Generate code
The ”control-flow” is fixed
email = get_last_email()
address = query_quarantined_llm(
f"Find Bob's email address in {email}",
output_schema=EmailStr
)
send_email(
subject="Meeting tomorrow",
body="Remember our meeting tomorrow",
recipient=address,
)


User query
"Find Bob's email in my last email and send him a reminder about tomorrow's meeting"
Privileged LLM
Quarantined LLM
Generate code
Process untrusted data
email = get_last_email()
address = query_quarantined_llm(
f"Find Bob's email address in {email}",
output_schema=EmailStr
)
send_email(
subject="Meeting tomorrow",
body="Remember our meeting tomorrow",
recipient=address,
)
Results from parsing untrusted data are treated as variables


User query
"Find Bob's email in my last email and send him a reminder about tomorrow's meeting"
Privileged LLM
Quarantined LLM
Generate code
Process untrusted data
email = get_last_email()
address = query_quarantined_llm(
f"Find Bob's email address in {email}",
output_schema=EmailStr
)
send_email(
subject="Meeting tomorrow",
body="Remember our meeting tomorrow",
recipient=address,
)
Program tracks data flow to flag unsafe actions

Evaluation on the AgentDojo benchmark.



Problem: How do we sandbox a **visual interface**?

Where are **trust boundaries** in visual interfaces?

3rd party images

organic content

3rd party text



How do we navigate the Web **programmatically**?

Conclusion

- **Vision is an attractive modality** for AI agents
  - Agents can piggyback on *interfaces designed for humans*
- **We don't know how to make LLMs robust to prompt injections**
- We can add **system guardrails** to sandbox LLM actions
  - Some *success for tool-calling agents*
  - How can we do this for a ***purely vision-based agent*?**